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Abstract This paper investigates the behavior of the reflexive anaphor herself in 
English in conditions of narrow focus and argues in favor of (i) a theory of focus 
that is based around the notion of Current Question, and (ii) a theory of 
association with focus that assumes that some, but not all, focus associating 
operators exhibit conventional association; i.e. some, but not all, focus associating 
operators have lexical semantics that directly encode association with focus. The 
argument is based on the independently motivated observation that there exist 
asymmetries with regard to disjoint reference effects between subject and object 
wh-questions.  
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1 Introduction 
As is well-known, the placement of accent in an utterance can have truth-
conditional effects in the presence of certain semantic operators, a phenomenon 
called association with focus. For example, in the case of the exclusive operator 
only, (1a), with focus on Bill, entails that John introduced no one else to Sue 
except Bill, whereas (1b), with focus on Sue, entails that John introduced Bill to 
no one but Sue.
1, 2
  
                                                 
∗
 I wish to thank Artemis Alexiadou, Florian Schäfer, Arndt Riester, and Michael Wagner for 
discussion. All errors are my own. Many thanks go to Bert Le Bruyn for his help with some 
formatting issues.  
1
 I assume that the syntactic correlate of focus is F-marking (cf. Jackendoff 1972) and syntactic 
nodes can be freely annotated with a privative feature F(ocus). In the phonological component, F-
marking is linked to prosodic prominence relative to a domain of focus (cf. Truckenbrodt 1995). I 
make the simplifying assumption that the domain of focus is always the full sentence. Prominence 
is indicated here with small capitals. Prosodic prominence in English correlates perceptually with 
pitch accent, which is acoustically realized with a local maximum or minimum of the fundamental 
frequency. 
2
 For the purposes of this paper, F-marking on a word corresponds to F-marking on that word 
alone. If required, F-marking of wider constituents will be indicated with the use of angled 
brackets. 
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(1) a. John introduced BILLF to Sue.                  
b. John introduced Bill to SUEF. 
The phenomenon of association with focus has received significant attention in 
the semantic literature and several frameworks have been developed to explain 
this type of meaning sensitivity to prosody (most prominently, Alternative 
Semantics, as in Rooth 1985, 1992, and Structured Meanings, as in von Stechow 
1990, Krifka 1992). In this paper I assume the framework of Alternative 
Semantics, so that each expression is associated with a set of alternatives, its 
Focus Semantic Value (FSV), and I focus on the extent to which the meaning of 
utterances with focus associating operators (FAOs) is determined by the lexical 
meanings of FAOs. In this respect, Rooth (1992) distinguishes between three 
possible theories of association with focus: (i) weak theories, according to which 
the link between FAOs and foci is part of the conventionalized lexical meaning of 
the operators (Rooth 1985), (ii) strong theories, according to which focus 
sensitivity emerges from the workings of general pragmatic mechanisms (Rooth 
1992, von Fintel 1994, Roberts 1996, 2004), and (iii) intermediate theories, 
according to which conventional association is true of some but not all FAOs 
(Rooth 1992, Beaver and Clark 2008). Roberts 1996, 2004 argues in favor of a 
strong theory built on a question-based discourse model. Beaver and Clark 2008 
undergoes a comprehensive comparison between different FAOs and concludes in 
favor of an intermediate theory cast in (a version of) Roberts’ question-based 
model. This paper argues in favor of the position in Beaver and Clark 2008, i.e. an 
intermediate theory of association with focus that is built on a question-based 
discourse model.  
My argument is based on the distribution of the alternatives generated by 
narrow focus on reflexive anaphors in English. Spathas (2010, 2011) observes 
that narrow focus on a reflexive anaphor is licensed in two rather different 
environments (see also Ahn 2012). For example, in the Question-Answer (QA) 
pairs in (2) and (3), the same sentence with the same intonational contour is used 
to answer both an object wh-question as in (2), as well as a subject wh-question as 
in (3). The regular meaning of (2/3A) is, of course, the same in both cases 
(roughly, the proposition that Zelda praised Zelda), but under focus-sensitive rules 
of QA-Congruence the generated alternatives should be able to vary both in the 
object position (Zelda praised x) for (2) to be felicitous, and in the subject 
position (x praised Zelda) for (3) to be felicitous. We refer to alternatives of the 
form Zelda praised x as Object Alternatives (OA) and to alternatives of the form x 
praised Zelda as Subject Alternatives (SA).3  
                                                 
3
 Notice that prosodic prominence of a reflexive anaphor in argument position unambiguously 
indicates narrow focus on the anaphor; in the case of wider focus domains, as in, e.g., VP focus in 
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(2)  Q: Who did Zelda praise? 
  A: She praised herSELFF. 
(3)  Q:   Who praised Zelda? 
  A: ? She praised herSELFF. 
As Spathas (2010, 2011) argues, the existence of SA forces a treatment of 
reflexive anaphors in terms of reflexivizing functions (as done mostly in the 
Categorial Grammar literature), as in (4a), rather than designated bound variables. 
Assuming (4a), a focused reflexive anaphor contrasts with other argument 
reducing operations like passivization and anti-passivization. The FSV of (2/3A), 
then, includes both SA and OA, as in, e.g., (4b). 
(4) a. [[herself]]  = λReetλx. R(x)(x) 
b. {Zelda praised Zelda, Oscar praised Zelda, Zelda praised Oscar, … } 
This paper assumes this result and investigates further the distribution of SA 
under different focus associating operators. It is shown that (i) SA are generally 
less accessible than OA, and (ii) SA do not arise with conventionally associating 
operators, i.e. operators that make direct reference to alternatives in their lexical 
semantics (in a way to be made precise below). These two generalizations are 
argued to receive straightforward explanations if (i) focus theory is built based on 
a question-based model, and (ii) conventional association with focus is 
association with the Current Question. The account is based on the additional, 
independently motivated observation that there exist asymmetries with regard to 
the presence of disjoint reference effects between object and subject wh-
questions.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section two establishes the two major 
generalizations covering the distribution of Subject and Object Alternatives. 
Section three presents an asymmetry between subject and object wh-questions; 
only the former exhibit a disjoint reference effect. Section four offers some new 
evidence in favor of a Current Question-based theory of focus and explains the 
reduced accessibility of SA on the basis of such a theory. Section five explains the 
impossibility of SA under conventionally associating operators under the 
assumption that conventional association is association with the Current Question. 
Section six concludes.  
                                                                                                                                     
(i), the reflexive anaphor necessarily prosodically subordinates to the verb. See Spathas 2010, Ahn 
2012 for alternative explanations of this pattern. 
(i) Q: What did Zelda do?     
A: Zelda [PRAISED herself]F.         
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2 The distribution of subject and object alternatives 
This section establishes the two major generalizations that govern the behavior of 
SA. It is shown that SA, when available, is less accessible than OA. Moreover, 
SA is possible in free focus environments and in cases of quasi- and free-
association, but not in cases of conventional association with focus. I proceed by 
first considering cases of free focus, before moving to cases of association with 
focus. 
2.1 Free focus 
The distribution of F-features in cases of free focus is determined by information-
structural considerations, usually some characterization of the notion of old-
information (see particularly Schwarzschild 1999). For current purposes I assume 
the notion of Match in (5) (from Büring 2008).
4,5
 Assuming a Kartunnen/ 
Hamblin style semantics for questions, according to which they denote sets of 
possible answers, in the case of QA-pairs Match is usually taken to require that 
the meaning of the question is a subset of the answer’s FSV, as in (6) (from 
Beaver and Clark 2008).6 
(5) Match 
There is some element M in the Focus Semantic Value of a sentence α 
which is a salient meaning in the discourse. 
(6) Focus Principle 
[[ Q]] is a subset of the Focus Semantic Value of some part of A.   
The distribution of OA and SA in cases of free focus is subject to (7). According 
to (7) there exists an asymmetry between OA and SA. This can be seen in the 
QA-pairs given in (2) and (3). As we observed there, both OA and SA are 
possible. However, in the case of a subject wh-question, as in (3), the accent 
                                                 
4
 As in the phonological component, I make the simplifying assumption that only sentences are 
domains of focus (i.e. Match is checked at the sentential level). I also do not discuss the necessary 
Economy component of focus theory, which is not relevant for the data discussed here. For 
discussion and different approaches to the formation of focus domains (and their relation with 
Economy) see Schwarzschild 1999, Wagner 2005, Büring 2008, Spathas 2010, among others.  
5
 Rooth (1992) treats the requirement posed by Match as a presupposition of his focus 
interpretation operator, the squiggle.  
6
 The Focus Principle is weaker that Match in that it is satisfied if some part of the answer satisfies 
the relevant requirement. This assumption simplifies the analysis of FAOs (see Beaver and Clark 
2008: 37 for discussion). Ideally, it should follow from a theory of focus domains. I do not have 
the space to go into this issue here. 
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pattern is somewhat degraded.
7
 The same pattern is observed in the corrective 
contexts in (8) and (9).  
(7) Generalization One 
Everything else being equal, Object Alternatives are more accessible than 
Subject Alternatives. 
(8) A: Zelda praised Oscar.    
B: No, she praised herSELFF.          
(9) A:   Oscar praised Zelda.  
B: ? No, she praised herSELFF. 
2.2 Association with focus 
In their typology of FAOs, Beaver and Clark (2008) distinguish between three 
classes of FAOs: Quasi-associating Operators (QAOs), Free-associating 
Operators (FrAOs), and Conventionally-associating Operators (CAOs). We 
present here the basic facts about SA following this typology. 
2.2.1 Quasi-associating operators  
QAOs are non-veridical, propositional operators like negation, intentional 
propositional modifiers, belief operators, etc. Consider, e.g., negation in (10) and 
(11). Although the effects of prosody are, in this case, not truth-conditional, 
differences in accent placement do lead to different inferences. Narrow focus on 
herself can generate two inferences: (i) that Zelda praised someone other than 
Zelda (OA), and (ii) that someone other than Zelda praised Zelda (SA). The 
availability of the two inferences is checked with two possible continuations, one 
compatible with OS (She praised Oscar in (10)) and one compatible with SA 
(Oscar praised her in (11)). The effects of (7) are manifested in such cases, as 
well. When confronted with (12) and no continuation, speakers always understand 
(12) to generate an inference based on OA, not SA. Similarly, (11), although 
perfectly possible, does seem to be somewhat degraded when compared to (10). 
Typically, speakers tend to warm-up to examples like (11) as the possibility of SA 
becomes more prominent/activated. I notate this state of affairs by adding a 
question mark in front of continuations licensed by SA.     
(10) Zelda didn’t praise herSELFF. She praised Oscar.    OA   
(11) Zelda didn’t praise herSELFF. ? Oscar praised her.    SA 
(12) Zelda didn’t praise herSELFF. 
                                                 
7
 Some speakers offer alternatives like the double focus variant ZELDA praised herSELF. See 
Spathas 2010, 2011 for discussion of this and other alternatives.  
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Negation forms a good environment for SA to arise in, especially in examples 
with non-animate subjects, since SA in these cases generates the only plausible 
inferences.
8
 In (13), for example, the only plausible inference is that someone 
other than the room should go clean the room (SA), not, of course, that the room 
should clean something other than itself (OA). In these cases, SA is perfectly 
natural.   
(13) Go clean your room - it won’t clean itSELFF.  
Other QAOs like the intentional modifier perhaps in (14) and (15) and the 
belief operator think in (16) and (17) behave similarly. 
(14) Perhaps Zelda praised herSELFF. Or perhaps she praised Oscar.  OA 
(15) Perhaps Zelda praised herSELFF.
 
?
 
Or perhaps Oscar praised her.  SA 
(16) I think Zelda praised herSELFF. She didn’t praise anyone else.     OA 
(17) I think Zelda praised herSELFF.
 
?
 
No one else praised her.      SA 
2.2.2 Free-associating operators (FrAOs) 
Free-associating operators quantify over an implicit domain, semantically 
represented as a variable over propositions. FrAOs include quantificational 
adverbs (18)/(19), generics/modals (20)/(21), and superlatives (22)/(23), among 
others. As with QAOs, SA are possible but less accessible than OAs.  
(18) Zelda always praises herSELFF.  
She never praises other people.           OA 
(19) Zelda always praises herSELFF.  
? No one else ever praises her.                SA 
(20) Ambitious people must praise themSELVESF.             
They shouldn’t praise other people.           OA  
(21) Lawyers must defend themSELVESF.                 
? They are not allowed to have other lawyers defend them.     SA 
(22) Zelda praised herSELFF the longest.                   
She only mentioned Oscar in passing.         OA 
                                                 
8
 Stephens 2006 discusses examples like These jokes write themSELVESF under the name ‘virtual 
reflexive construction’. She claims that such cases exhibit an independent argument structure 
configuration. According to Stephens, virtual reflexives ‘convey that the given activity is 
particularly easy for some agent to accomplish’ (Stephens 2006: 277), while also ‘allowing a 
partial transfer of agentivity to the patient-subject’ (Stephens 2006: 143). The examples can be 
subsumed under the present proposal; they exhibit nothing more than regular SA readings of 
focused reflexivizers that associate with a covert FAO, probably Krifka´s (1995) Emphatic Focus 
operator that indicates that the asserted proposition is particularly unlikely with respect to its 
alternatives.  
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(23) Zelda praised herSELFF the longest.                  
? Oscar only mentioned her in passing.          SA 
2.2.3 Conventionally-associating operators (CAOs) 
Conventionally Associating Operators are also operators that have been assumed 
to include implicit variables. The resolution of the implicit variable, however, is 
not done through pragmatic mechanisms, but is encoded in the conventional 
lexical meanings of the operators. Beaver and Clark (2008) identify exclusives 
(24)/(25), scalar additives (26)/(27), additives (28)/(29), and particularizers 
(30)/(31) as CAOs. For all these, SA are not possible. The contrast between CAOs 
and other associating operators leads to the generalization in (32).
9, 10
 
(24) Zelda only praised herSELFF. She didn’t praised anyone else.  OA 
(25) Zelda only praised herSELFF.
 
#
 
No one else praised her.   SA 
(26) Zelda praised many people. She even praised herSELFF.   OA 
(27) Many people praised Zelda.
 
#
 
She even praised herSELFF.   SA 
(28) First, Zelda praised Oscar. Later, she praised herSELFF too.  OA 
(29) First, Oscar praised Zelda.
 
#
 
Later, she praised herSELFF too.  SA 
(30) Zelda praised many people. E.g., she praised herSELFF.   OA 
(31) Many people praised Zelda.
 
#
 
E.g, she praised herSELFF.   SA 
(32) Generalization Two 
Object Alternatives are possible with all Focus Associating Operators. 
Subject Alternatives are possible with Quasi- and Free-associating 
Operators, but not with Conventionally-associating Operators. 
2.3 Always vs. only  
Beaver and Clark (2008) base their distinction between FrAOs and CAOs on a 
detailed comparison between the operators always and only. We can directly 
compare the behavior of only and always with regard to the licensing of SA in 
cases of quantification over events.
11
 Consider the minimal contrast in (33). The 
                                                 
9
 Some individual variation among speakers exists; speakers might find some CAOs better with 
SA than others. Importantly, no CAO is consistently judged on a par with QAOs and FrAOs, and 
all CAOs are consistently reported to be worse than QAOs and FrAOs.  
10
 For most speakers, SA consistently arise with a certain class of predicates, that of Naturally 
Reflexive Verbs, i.e. verbs that have intransitive reflexive variants like wash, dress, etc. Spathas 
(2012) argues that in such cases herself is not an anaphor in argumental position but rather an 
adverbial anti-assistive intensifier, as in Mary built the house herself.  
11
 For event-based meanings of only see, e.g., Bonomi and Casalegno 1993, Beaver and Clark 
2008: 155-6. 
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context in (33) forces a SA reading of (33a) and (33b), but only the variant with 
always is felicitous. Notice that the contrast is specific to SA; OA is possible for 
both only and always, as shown in (34).
 
 
(33) Context: Oscar is a petty criminal who always finds himself having to face 
some charge in court. Being a lawyer himself, he does not need to hire 
another attorney to defend him; if he chooses, he can defend himself in 
court.  Does he ever use this option? 
a. ?
 
Yes, he always defends himSELFF (when accused of something). 
b. #
 
Yes, he only defends himSELFF (when accused of something).   
      ‘Whenever someone defends Oscar, Oscar defends Oscar.’ 
(34) Context: Oscar is a petty criminal who usually works with his brother. They 
always find themselves having to face some charge or other in court. Being 
a lawyer himself, Oscar does not need to hire another attorney to defend 
him; if he chooses, he can defend himself in court. In fact, if he wants to, he 
can defend his brother. Does he ever do that? 
a. ?
 
No, he always defends himSELFF. 
b. ?
 
No, he only defends himSELFF.   
     ‘Whenever Oscar defends someone, Oscar defends Oscar.’ 
3 Subject-object asymmetries in disjoint reference effects 
The analysis of the two generalizations above relies on an independent 
observation: subject wh-questions exhibit a disjoint reference effect, whereas 
object wh-questions do not. Consider first the QA-pair in (35). Speaker A answers 
the object wh-question by first asserting that Zelda praised no one and then 
continuing with the assertion that Zelda praised Zelda, an illegitimate move. The 
infelicity of She praised herSELF in (35A) can be explained as follows. By the 
use of She praised no one, the speaker asserts that all the propositions in [[Whom 
did Zelda praise]] are false. This includes the proposition that Zelda praised Zelda, 
as in (36) (assuming that Zelda, Oscar, and Lucie are the only relevant 
individuals). With She praised herSELF the speaker asserts that Zelda praised 
Zelda, a contradiction. 
(35) Q: Whom did Zelda praise?    
A: She praised no one. # She praised herSELFF. 
(36) [[Whom did Zelda praise?]] = {Zelda praised Zelda, Zelda praised Oscar,   
                                                Zelda praised Lucie} 
Note that exactly the same reasoning should lead to a contradiction in the case 
of the subject wh-question in (37). No contradiction arises, however. This can be 
so if the proposition that Zelda praised Zelda is not in [[Who praised Zelda?]], 
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which I call a disjoint reference effect.
12
 If so, by asserting that Zelda praised no 
one, Speaker A does not assert that Zelda did not praise Zelda
13
 and can proceed 
to assert that this is the case without contradiction. 
(37) Q: Who praised Zelda?    
A: No one praised her. She praised herSELFF.  
(38) [[Who praised Zelda?]] = {Oscar praised Zelda, Lucie praised Zelda} 
4 A Current Question based theory of focus 
4.1 Subject alternatives and the Question Rule   
We can now go back to the QA-pairs in (2) and (3), repeated here as (39) and 
(40). As discussed in section 2.1, QA-pairs are subject to the Focus Principle, 
which is satisfied in (39) and (40) if reflexive anaphors are arity reducers, as 
suggested in (4a) (Spathas 2010, 2011).   
(39) Q: Who did Zelda praise? 
A: She praised herSELFF. 
(40) Q:   Who praised Zelda? 
A: ? She praised herSELFF. 
A second requirement is that the answer is a partial or complete answer to the 
question (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984). Assuming a Hamblin/Kartunnen-
style semantics for questions, partial and complete answers can be defined as 
follows (from Roberts 1996, Beaver and Clark 2008). 
                                                 
12
 The most famous disjoint reference effects are Principle B effects as in *Zelda1 praised her1. 
Baker, Johnson, and Roberts 1989 reports disjoint reference effects for passives; the implicit 
argument cannot be coreferential with the theme-subject in examples like They were admired. As 
Daniel Büring (p.c.) points out, Kehler and Büring 2008 proposes a generalized principle of 
disjointness in wh-questions containing pronouns. BBBD in (ii) captures, e.g., the disjointness 
effect between John and the bound pronoun in (iii). See Schlenker 2005 for a more general 
account of disjoint reference. As far as I have been able to determine, so far none of the existing 
accounts can explain the subject-object asymmetries discussed in the main text and I cannot offer 
a satisfying explanation either. It is important to add that by using the term ‘disjoint reference 
effects’ I do not wish to claim that all the cases mentioned here will necessarily have a unified 
explanation. 
(ii) Be Bound or Be Disjoint (BBBD) 
If a pronoun p is free in the c-command domain of a (non-wh) DP a, p bears a 
presupposition of disjointness with a. 
(iii) Who1 thinks that John loves his1 wife? 
13
 At least under the reasonable assumption that no one and the wh-element in the question share 
the same contextual restriction. 
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(41) A complete answer is an utterance expressing a proposition which 
determines the truth-value of every proposition in [[Q]]. 
(42) A partial answer is an utterance which expresses a proposition which is 
incompatible with one or more alternative in [[Q]] and compatible with more 
than one logically independent alternative. 
Given exhaustification, the answer in both (39) and (40), which denotes the 
proposition that Zelda praised Zelda is a complete answer. In the case of (39), the 
answer determines that it is true that Zelda praised Zelda and false that Oscar 
praised Zelda and Lucie praised Zelda.14 In the case of (40), the answer 
determines that both propositions in [[(39Q)]], as in (38), are false. The difference 
between (39) and (40), then, is that, given the disjoint reference effect associated 
with subject wh-question, in the case of (40) none of the propositions in [[(40Q)]] 
turn out to be true.  
This is relevant for what Beaver and Clark (2008: 37) propose to be a third 
requirement for QA-congruence, namely that a question should offer at least one 
true alternative, as in (42) (cf. Geurts and van der Sandt 2004).  
(43) Current Question Rule   
The current question must contain at least one true alternative, and contain 
multiple alternatives which are not resolved as true or false in the common 
ground. 
 The QA-pair in (40), then, but not the one in (39), violates (43). I propose that 
this violation is the reason for the reduced accessibility of SA in (40). The result 
of the violation is a mismatch between the assumptions of the interlocutors; 
whereas the question does not consider the proposition that Zelda praised Zelda to 
be among the possible true alternatives, the answer asserts that it is in fact true. 
Notice that the violation in (40) does not lead to a complete break-down of 
communication; speaker A cannot be expected to concur with all the assumptions 
of speaker Q. What is expected, however, is that she explicitly rejects a question 
if she knows that it violates (43). I assume that this is what is done in, e.g., (37); 
by the use of No one praised her, Speaker A explicitly rejects Who praised 
Zelda? as a legitimate CQ, so that the discourse proceeds unhindered in this case.  
                                                 
14
 I take the exhaustification inference to be a scalar implicature derived by Grice´s Maxim of 
Quantity. One could also use a grammatical theory of exhaustification as in Chierchia 2004, Fox 
2006, as long as the Exh operator is treated as a free-, not a conventionally-associating operator 
(cf. the discussion in section 5).   
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4.2 Deriving Generalization One   
The reasoning above explains the asymmetry between the QA-pairs in (39) and 
(40), but Generalization One states that the asymmetry between OA and SA holds 
across the board. The behaviour can be generalized to both free focus and 
association with focus, if we adopt a question-based discourse theory. I adopt and 
present here briefly Beaver and Clark’s 2008 re-interpretation of the model of 
Roberts 1996. As in Stalnaker 1972, the objective of information-seeking 
discourses is taken to be to narrow down the context set, i.e. answer the question 
‘What’s the world like?’. The main innovation is the assumption that interlocutors 
devise strategies to that effect using sequences of questions that stand in 
entailment relations (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984). So, in (44) (where 
indentations indicate entailment relations), answering the super-question ‘What’s 
the world like?’ requires answering all the questions that it entails.  
(44) What’s the world like?   
   What happened at the meeting? 
            Who praised whom? 
                   Who praised Zelda? 
              Whom did Zelda praise? 
At any given moment in discourse, interlocutors have two legitimate moves: 
they can either answer the Current Question, defined in (45), or ask a question 
from the sequence (which is then promoted as the Current Question). The 
legitimacy of a discourse move is regulated by the two principles in (46) and (47) 
(repeated from (6)) (from Beaver and Clark 2008: 37).
15
  
(45) Current Question (CQ)                 
The question mutually accepted by the interlocutors as the most immediate 
goal of the discourse becomes the Current Question. 
(46) Discourse Principle 
Utterances should be maximally relevant to the CQ. 
(47) Focus Principle 
[[ Q]] is a subset of the Focus Semantic Value of (some part of) A.   
According to the Discourse Principle, a declarative utterance is always an answer 
to the Current Question. When the CQ is not explicit, it will be accommodated. 
Given the Focus Principle, accommodation is driven by the focus structure of the 
declarative sentence, i.e. by the Focus Principle. Consider, e.g., the corrections 
repeated in (48) and (49). The focus structure [Zelda praised herselfF] allows 
accommodation of both Whom did Zelda praise? and Who praised Zelda?. Due to 
                                                 
15
 Notice that if all declarative utterances are answers to the Current Question, Match in (5) can be 
dispensed with. 
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the Discourse Principle, when a native speaker informer is confronted with a 
minimal discourse as in, e.g., (48) and is asked to judge its felicity, she first tries 
to establish the CQ speakers A and B are answering. Assuming that a correction 
rejects a proposed answer to the CQ (see the discussion in the next section), the 
native speaker uses both assertions in (48A) and (48B) in order to establish the 
CQ. Of the two questions the focus structure of (48B) is compatible with, only the 
object wh-question is compatible with Speaker A´s assertion (i.e. Zelda praised 
Oscar can only be an answer to the object wh-question). A native speaker, then, 
accommodates the question Whom did Zelda praise?. In the case of (49), exactly 
parallel reasoning leads a native speaker to accommodate the subject wh-question. 
In this case, however, accommodation of Who praised Zelda? leads to a violation 
of the Current Question Rule.     
(48) A: Zelda praised Oscar.    
B: No, she praised herSELFF.          
(49) A:   Oscar praised Zelda.  
B: ? No, she praised herSELFF. 
Turning to association with focus cases, consider again the examples involving 
negation, repeated here in (50), (51), and (52). According to the Focus Principle, 
the focus semantic value of a part of Zelda didn’t praise herSELFF should be a 
superset of the meaning of the CQ. This could be the form without negation, i.e. 
Zelda praised herSELFF. As above, this allows accommodation of two CQs. In 
(50), the presence of She praised Oscar forces accommodation of Whom did 
Zelda praise?. In (51), the presence of Oscar praised her forces accommodation 
of Who praised Zelda?. Notice that in this case the Current Question Rule is not 
violated, since the proposition that Oscar praised Zelda, which is part of the 
meaning of Who praised Zelda?, is asserted to be true. I propose that the difficulty 
arises because a native speaker confronted with (51) needs to assume that the 
utterer of (51) considers the proposition that Zelda praised Zelda a possible 
answer to the question Who praised Zelda? even though this proposition is not 
part of the meaning of the question. In other words, if the utterer of (51) wants to 
answer the question Who praised Zelda? why does he bother rejecting the 
proposition that Zelda praised Zelda when this proposition is not a possible 
answer to begin with? Again, since the proposition that Zelda praised Zelda is in 
fact a complete answer to this question, accommodating this question is not 
impossible and it can happen when the continuation requires it. When confronted 
with an out-of-the-blue example as in (52), however, speakers will always assume 
that the prejacent is an answer to the question Whom did Zelda praise? for which 
no such issues arise.  
(50) Zelda didn’t praise herSELFF. She praised Oscar.    OA   
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(51) Zelda didn’t praise herSELFF. ? Oscar praised her.    SA 
(52) Zelda didn’t praise herSELFF. 
4.3 Too many alternatives?   
This section presents additional evidence in favour of the Beaver and 
Clark/Roberts model. The observation is that narrow focus on a reflexive anaphor 
always generates a set of alternatives that includes either SA or OA, but never 
both. This is illustrated here with a case of free focus, corrective contexts. 
Consider, first, the correction in (53) (based on Schwarzschild’s 1999 example 
(50)); (53B) is taken to reject only that Zelda praised Oscar, not that Oscar praised 
Zelda, or both that Zelda praised Oscar and Oscar praised Zelda.
16
 Why is that? 
Schwarzschild’s intuition for similar examples is that focus feeds the rhetorical 
relations between utterances in discourse. We could assume, then, that the 
propositions in Speaker A’s utterance that are rejected are those that are elements 
in the Focus Semantic Value of Speaker B’s utterance (i.e. the propositions that 
act as antecedents for focus licensing). In the case of (53), narrow focus on Helen 
generates alternatives of the form Zelda praised x, and of the propositions in 
Speaker A’s utterance only the proposition that Zelda praised Oscar is in that set. 
(53) A: Zelda praised Oscar and Oscar praised Zelda.  
B: No, Zelda praised HELENF. 
The intuition fails, however, for parallel cases with reflexive anaphors, as in 
(54). (54B) is taken to reject that Zelda praised Oscar, and not that Oscar praised 
Zelda or that Zelda praised Oscar and Oscar praised Zelda.
17
 The simple account 
above predicts that both propositions are rejected, since both are in the FSV of 
Zelda praised herSELFF. An alternative way to explain the facts is to assume that 
the rejection is influenced by the choice of accommodated CQ. On the basis of 
(54B) one can accommodate either Whom did Zelda praise? or Who praised 
Zelda?. If the former is accommodated, Zelda praised herself is proffered as the 
only true answer to that question, so the proposition that Zelda praised Oscar is 
rejected. Similarly, accommodating Who praised Zelda? would lead to rejection 
of the proposition that Oscar praised Zelda. The question Who praised Zelda?, on 
the other hand, is not accommodated since it leads to a violation of the Current 
Question Rule. 
                                                 
16
 The rejection of both propositions in (52A) requires the use of double focus, as in ZELDAF 
praised HELENF. If so, the FSV includes propositions of the form x praised y, and both 
propositions in (53A) are elements of this set. 
17
 As in (53), rejection of both propositions in (53A) requires the use of double focus, as in ZELDAF 
praised herSELFF. Double focus makes possible the accommodation of the CQ Who praised who?.  
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(54) A: Zelda praised Oscar and Oscar praised Zelda. 
B: No, Zelda praised herSELFF. 
5 An intermediate theory of association with focus 
Beaver and Clark 2008 argues for a specific analysis of conventional association 
with focus, according to which conventional association manifests a grammatical 
dependency on the Current Question. I argue that this analysis explains 
Generalization Two, i.e. the fact that SA do not arise with a certain class of FAOs.     
5.1 Degrees of association 
As mentioned in the introduction, Rooth 1992 distinguishes between three 
possible theories of focus sensitivity: (i) weak theories, (ii) strong theories, and 
(iii) intermediate theories. I illustrate each theory using the exclusive only, 
following the scalar account of the exclusive particle of Beaver and Clark 2008 in 
(55) (the entry is adapted from Coppock and Beaver 2011). As usual, only 
expresses quantification over a set of propositions C. Moreover, it comments on 
the relative strength of the different propositions in C. Its presuppositional 
component requires that no proposition in C is weaker or unranked with respect to 
the prejacent of only (i.e. the proposition expressed by the LF minus only). This is 
achieved through the use of MIN, as defined in (56a) (≥ represents the strength 
ranking, which in the cases dealt with here is based on entailment). The ordinary 
semantic component of only requires that no proposition in C is stronger than the 
prejacent. This is achieved through the use of MAX, as defined in (56b).  
(55) [[ only ]] = λp. MIN(p). MAX(p)          
(56) a. MIN(p) = ∃q ∈ C [true(q) ∧ q ≥ p] 
b. MAX(p) = ∀q ∈ C [true(q) → p ≥ q] 
The question, then, is how the value of the variable C is determined and why it 
is dependent on focus placement. In a strong theory, C is contextually resolved. 
Pragmatic principles, like, e.g., the Discourse Principle in (46), determine that, in 
most cases, it is resolved to the same object that acts as the antecedent for focus 
licensing. In the Roberts/Beaver and Clark model, where every declarative 
sentence is an answer to the CQ, the relevant object is the CQ. Association with 
focus, then, is only indirect, via, e.g., the CQ. In a weak theory, association with 
focus is written directly in the semantics of only. In, e.g., Rooth 1985, the 
quantifier ranges over the propositions in the sentences alternative value. MIN 
and MAX, then, could be defined as in (57).  
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(57) a. MIN(p) = ∃q ∈ [[ p]]
f
 [true(q) ∧ q ≥ p]    
b. MAX(p) = ∀q ∈ [[ p]]f [true(q) → p ≥ q] 
Although strong theories derive association with focus for only, they leave 
open the possibility that the truth-conditional content will not always be affected 
by the placement of focus; although the free variable can, and generally will, be 
resolved to the denotation of the CQ, it does not have to be. The existence or non-
existence of such cases has been the main empirical contention between defenders 
of weak and strong theories. Beaver and Clark 2008 provides a variety of tests 
that distinguish between weak and strong association with focus. Crucially, they 
show that not all FAOs behave alike, and that a typology of FAOs should include 
the three categories mentioned above; QAOs, FrAOs, and CAOs. Among those, 
only CAOs exhibit a conventionalized dependency. Crucially, the 
conventionalized dependency is not a dependency with the FSV, but a 
dependency with the Current Question, as in (58). The discourse function of 
CAOs is to comment, in one way or another, on the CQ. For example, the 
exclusive only comments on the relative strength of possible answers to the CQ.    
(58) a. MIN(p) = ∃q ∈ CQ [true(q) ∧ q ≥ p]  
b. MAX(p) = ∀q ∈ CQ [true(q) → p ≥ q] 
5.2 Deriving Generalization Two 
Consider now the contrast between always and only in licensing SA, repeated 
here in (59) and (60). Always is a universal quantifier that ranges over a free 
variable, a variable over sets of events (von Fintel 1994). Since always is a FrAO 
according to Beaver and Clark 2008, the relevant reading in (59) will come about 
if the variable is resolved to a set of events of the type x praised Zelda in e. As 
long as the context makes such a set available, SA is possible. In the case of (60), 
SA will arise if only ranges over a set of propositions of the type x praised Zelda. 
The crucial difference with (59) is that the set can only be picked up through the 
CQ Who praised Zelda?. Given the focus structure in (60), this CQ can be 
accommodated. It exhibits, however, a disjoint reference effect, so that the 
relevant set will include, e.g., the proposition that Oscar praised Zelda, but not the 
proposition that Zelda praised Zelda. Recall that the presupposition of only 
requires that there is at least one true proposition in [[ CQ]] that is equal or stronger 
than Zelda praised Zelda. Since the proposition that Zelda praised Zelda is not in  
[[ CQ]], there is no proposition in [[ CQ]] to satisfy the presupposition of only. The 
deviance of SA in (60), then, is the result of presupposition failure.  
(59) Zelda always praises herSELFF. ? No one else ever praises her.        
(60) Zelda only praised herSELFF.
 
#
 
No one else praised her.          
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More generally, given the discourse function of CAOs as providing comments on 
the CQ and the fact that the CQ is part of their conventional meaning, subject wh-
questions will always lead to violations of the Current Question Rule, but, 
crucially, for one and the same speaker. Whereas in examples like (2) speaker A 
gives an answer that does not conform to the assumptions of speaker Q, in, e.g., 
(60) the speaker must himself accept the CQ together with all its assumptions, as 
the CQ is part of the meaning of only. The speaker, then, puts forward a CQ (via 
accommodation) according to which the proposition that Zelda praised Zelda is 
not a possible answer, and answers the question by asserting that Zelda praised 
Zelda, which is clearly a contradiction. It is predicted, then, that SA will not 
improve if the CQ is explicit, as in (61A1), or even if it is explicitly rejected, as in 
(61A2), since it is immediately re-introduced through the lexical semantics of 
only.  
(61) Q:      Who praised Zelda?    
A1: # She only praised herSELFF. 
A2:    No one praised her. 
#
 She only praised herSELFF.  
6 Conclusions 
Recent literature on focus theory has unearthed several differences between focus 
associating operators and has made the first steps into establishing a typology of 
such elements. This paper adds to this line of research by establishing a further 
environment that distinguishes between free and conventional association with 
focus: the licensing of Subject Alternatives generated by narrowly focusing 
reflexive anaphors in English. Moreover, it is argued that these differences can be 
explained if one adopts a theory of focus that is based on a specific type of 
discourse model, one built around the notion of Current Question. 
 The analysis presented here leaves open several issues and opens up possible 
avenues for further research. The analysis is based on the existence of 
asymmetries with regard to disjoint reference effects between subject and object 
wh-questions, for which no account was offered. As mentioned in footnote 10, 
Subject Alternatives do seem to arise with a certain class of predicates, a fact 
attributed to the availability of a construal in which herself is an anti-assistive 
intensifier. If so, there exists a second road to SA which is based on 
intensification rather than reflexivization and is not subject to the restrictions of 
Generalization Two. If this suggestion is on the right track, the availability of SA 
with Conventionally Associating Operators becomes a way to probe into the 
semantics and the composition of complex reflexive anaphors across languages 
answering some long-standing questions within Binding Theory.      
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